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INTRODUCTION 
In early 2000, a developer proposed a new seventeen-story apartment building for the 
corner of Madison Avenue and 91st street located within Manhattan’s Carnegie Hill Historic 
District.1  Although the building was not much taller than nearby buildings, and within the 
allowable height limit allowed by the zoning code,2 as a new building in an existing historic 
district, its design required approval by the New York City Landmarks Preservation 
Commission.  Given the property’s location on New York’s posh Upper East Side, the debate 
over the suitability of the building drew out some of the city’s most famous celebrities, and none 
less than Woody Allen. 
                                                          
1 See “Landmarks Panel Blocks a Tower Opposed by Woody Allen,” NEW YORK TIMES, June 14, 2000, at 
B3. 
2 See “The Big City: Woody Allen and Some Curious Logic,” NEW YORK TIMES, April 10, 2001. 
After hearing testimony from several notable citizens,3 the Commission rejected the 
proposed plan for the apartment tower.  Explaining that the architects had “failed to consider the 
sense of place” in the neighborhood,4 the Commission declared the tower too tall and out of 
context with the area.  Echoing concern over the size of the building and summing it up for local 
residents, Mr. Allen quipped, “[i]f they said they want to build a 10-story building, fine.”5 
Undaunted by the Commission’s rejection, the developers returned the following year 
with a scaled-down version of the building—the 10-story design alluded to by the Commission 
and Mr. Allen.  However, by this time Allen had changed his tune.  He explained that if the 
Commission were to approved the reduced design, the entire neighborhood would be “ruined.”6  
Ultimately, the commission rejected this proposal as well.7 
Although this dispute is notably peculiar for its high-profile players, its underlying 
themes are typical.  Across the country there are historic districts and landmark sites which are 
similarly “threatened” by new construction or renovation.  Local historic preservation 
commissions regularly decide whether building designs are appropriate, acting as arbiters in 
battles that pit residents, historians, artists, and even politicians against developers and 
community investors.  And as illustrated above, these commissions are granted much leeway to 
accept or reject designs that are technically in compliance with general building codes and 
otherwise deemed appropriate for the location. 
                                                          
3 In addition to Allen, who presented a short film about the neighborhood to the Landmarks Preservation 
Commission in February, other famous neighbors voicing their disapproval of the design included: author and 
former White House speechwriter Peggy Noonan; Sir Howard Stringer, Chairman of Sony Corporation of America; 
and U.S. Representative Carolyn B. Maloney.  See “Landmarks Panel,” supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 See “The Big City,” supra note 2. 
6 Id. 
7 See “Manhattan Community Boards,” NEW YORK OBSERVER, November 26, 2001, at 12.  Ultimately, the 
Commission approved a nine-story building for the site, see “Boldface Names,” NEW YORK TIMES, December 13, 
2001, at D2, although several exterior details including balconies were removed to make the building less obtrusive.  
See “Manhattan Community Boards,” supra. 
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This paper will examine some of the larger effects these site-specific preservation 
decisions have on the urban fabric.  Nearly twenty-five years ago, the United States Supreme 
Court validated the practice of historic designation in the landmark case Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. City of New York.8  In the years since this decision, planners and 
academics alike have widely heralded and universally accepted historic preservation zoning as an 
important practice for preserving and enhancing the quality of life in our cities.   
Notwithstanding this unanimous acceptance, this paper illustrates that times have 
changed since Penn Central.  Because the benefits of historic landmarking have gone almost 
entirely unquestioned,9 few have considered the negative effects of this practice on larger 
planning and social issues.  Particularly in light of the problem of urban sprawl, no recent study 
has attempted to examine whether the continuing designation of historic buildings and districts 
provides only benefits.  Moreover, since Penn Central, the legal landscape has also changed.  In 
the nearly quarter-century since Penn Central declared that landmark designation did not violate 
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has shown a propensity to scrutinize more strictly the limits 
of governmental action as regards Fifth Amendment takings.  
In light of changes in the urban and legal context since Penn Central, this paper seeks to 
examine the heretofore unaccounted for external costs of preservation.  In particular, and using 
New York City as its subject, this paper examines the aggregate effects of the Landmark 
Preservation Commission’s decisions to scale down or outright reject new construction in 
landmarked areas as described above.  A question that has gone unasked is this: assuming a 
developer has done their homework and recognized a demand for a particular building or area, 
                                                          
8 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
9 The significant exception is the issue of gentrification, which is not the subject of this paper except to the 
extent that it is mentioned in footnotes. 
 3 
where does that demand go when the Commission rejects their proposal?10  While the answer to 
this question  may not seem particularly important regarding a single building or lot, the 
cumulative effect of these individual decisions may be considerable. 
Since the mid-1960s, New York City has designated over 21,000 buildings and sites as 
landmarks, thereby subjecting them to Commission review.  This paper points up the potential 
costs of preservation particularly its potential contribution to the problem of urban sprawl as 
more urban building space is shut out.  The principal purpose is to illustrate that these decisions, 
undertaken with only the building site and immediate area in mind, may have larger 
consequences.  This paper seeks to discuss and more closely quantify those negative external 
effects. 
Part One explains the purpose of historic preservation zoning, the Penn Central decision, 
the premises underlying the decision, and the legacy of the case as a validator of  preservation 
zoning practice.  Part Two reviews the pressing urban problem of sprawl and examines how the 
cumulative effect of landmarking individual parcels and neighborhoods can contribute to the 
problem.  Using New York City as the example, the paper identifies the potential connection 
between landmark designation and urban sprawl by showing that placing limits on highest and 
best use within the preserved urban core may contribute to a significant loss of greenspace on the 
urban fringe.  In Part Three, the paper discusses changes in takings jurisprudence since Penn 
Central, whereby the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to apply greater scrutiny to 
Fifth Amendment takings cases.  Here, it is suggested that judicial recognition of the cumulative 
negative impacts discussed in Part Two could make the practice of preservation zoning more 
                                                          
10 One possibility is that the disallowed space is simply transferred to adjacent properties under New York’s 
Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) program.  But TDRs are rarely the simple fix their proponents claim them to 
be.  See Joseph D. Stinson, Note, Transferring Development Rights: Purpose, Problems, and Prospects in New 
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susceptible to a takings challenge in the future.  As such, the paper recommends steps that might 
be taken to ensure that landmarking continues to serve a valid public purpose while steering clear 
of future constitutional challenges. 
I. PENN CENTRAL AND ITS LEGACY 
A.  Historic Preservation Prior to Penn Central 
 Prior to the 1960s, very few local governments utilized zoning codes to preserve historic 
properties in this country.  Preservation of landmark buildings and areas was essentially a private 
matter.11  During that decade, however, the scope of preservation widened drastically, triggered 
by the side-effects of two well-intended but major federal programs--interstate highway 
construction and urban renewal.12  These well-funded programs caused a great deal of social 
displacement and destruction of the built environment at the historic core of most sizeable 
American cities.  By 1965, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, alarmed at the degree of destruction 
taking place in their cities, put out a call to action that marked the beginning of widespread 
governmental involvement with historic resources.13   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
York, 17 PACE L. REV. 319 (1996); Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the 
Well-Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 867 (1984). 
11 Famous early efforts include the 19th century preservation of Mount Vernon, by the Mount Vernon 
Ladies Association, and preservation and restoration of Williamsburg, Virginia by John D. Rockefeller during the 
1920s.  Prior to World War II, only Charleston and New Orleans had some form of ordinance designed to protect 
their historic districts.  For a history of the early movement, see James Marston Fitch, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 83-
108 (1990), and William J. Murtagh, KEEPING TIME: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF PRESERVATION IN AMERICA, 25-
49 (1988). 
12 See Murtagh, supra note 10, at 62. 
13 The Conference of Mayors warned that private efforts of preserving individual landmark buildings was 
no longer enough.  It explained:   
Since World War II a great wave of urbanization has been sweeping across the Nation. . . .  Out of 
the turbulence of building, tearing down and rebuilding the face of America, more and more 
Americans have come to realize that as the future replaces the past, it destroys much of the 
physical evidence of the past.  The current pace of preservation effort is not enough. . . .  The time 
has come for bold, new measures and a national plan of action to insure that we, our children, and 
future generations may have a genuine opportunity to appreciate and to enjoy our rich heritage. . . .  
If the preservation movement is to be successful, it must go beyond saving bricks and mortar.  It 
must go beyond saving occasional historic houses and opening museums.  It must be more than a 
cult of antiquarians.  It must do more than revere a few precious national shrines.  It must attempt 
to give a sense of orientation to our society, using structures and objects of the past to establish 
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The situation in post-war New York City was typical.  But there, a single event triggered 
the passage of one of the earliest and most comprehensive landmark designation ordinances in 
the country.  In 1963, the city razed historic Pennsylvania Station to allow for construction of the 
new Madison Square Garden.  The ensuing public outcry led directly to the passage of New 
York’s Landmarks Preservation Ordinance,14 a code heralded by some as the “the single most 
influential piece of legislation affecting land use in New York since the first zoning laws.”15   
Under New York’s landmark preservation law, the responsibility for the city’s 
preservation program falls on the Landmarks Preservation Commission [Commission], an eleven 
member body that identifies properties and areas of “special character or special historical or 
aesthetic interest.”16  If the Commission determines this criteria has been met, it designates the 
identified property or area respectively as an historic landmark or district.17  Designation under 
the ordinance has essentially two effects on property owners: first, it creates an affirmative duty 
to keep the building in good repair; second, it requires that any exterior alterations or additions to 
the building be approved in advance by the Commission.18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
values of time and place. . . . [T]he new preservation must look beyond the individual building and 
individual landmark and concern itself with the historic and architecturally valued areas and 
districts which contain a special meaning for the community. . . . In sum, if we wish to have a 
future with greater meaning, we must concern ourselves not only with the historic highlights, but 
we must be concerned with the total heritage of the nation and all that is worth preserving from 
our past as a living part of the present. 
Albert Rains and Laurence G. Henderson, eds., WITH HERITAGE SO RICH, 204-208 (1966).   In WITH HERITAGE SO 
RICH, the Conference of Mayors indicated and illustrated that nearly half of the buildings identified by the federal 
Historic American Buildings Survey in 1935 had already been destroyed.  See id at 205.  This publication 
contributed directly to the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act in 1966, and a proliferation of local 
preservation ordinances nationwide. 
14 See John Nivala, The Future of Our Past: Preserving Landmark Preservation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 83, 
89 (1996). 
15 Paul Goldberger, New York, Lost and Found, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, at E3 (cited in Nivala, supra 
note 14, at 83).  
16 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 110 (1978) (quoting NY Landmark 
Preservation Law). 
17 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 110.  The Commission’s determination was however, subject to the 
approval of the New York City Board of Estimate.  See id. at 111. 
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B.  Penn Central v. City of New York 
In 1978, the case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York19 put to the 
constitutional test the practice of protecting historic properties via zoning controls.  By the time 
the case came before the Supreme Court, New York City had designated some thirty-one historic 
districts and over four-hundred landmarks under its ordinance.20  Among the four-hundred 
individual landmarks was Grand Central Terminal, one of the city’s most famous buildings, 
designated a landmark in 1967.21  At issue in the case was Penn Central’s plan to build a fifty-
five story office tower on the Grand Central site.   
In an attempt to garner approval of its design, Penn Central proposed not to raze the 
station to construct the tower, but rather to preserve the exterior of the building and cantilever the 
high-rise over its facade.22   The Commission, following four days of public hearings, rejected 
two of the company’s proposals as being inappropriate for the landmark site.23  Penn Central, 
having entered into a fifty-year agreement to lease the planned skyscraper, challenged the 
Commission’s action, claiming the application of the preservation ordinance effectuated a taking 
of its property without due process of law.24 
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue had been distilled to whether 
the landmark designation of the terminal amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation.25   As such, the dispute provided a test case 
for the viability of government sponsored historic preservation.  Under the stipulation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 See id. at 111-12. 
19 438 U.S. 104. 
20 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 111. 
21 See id. at 115. 
22 See id. at 116-17. 
23 See id. 117. 
24 See id. at 119. 
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parties, at issue was not whether preservation could be characterized as an appropriate means for 
achieving a legitimate governmental goal, but whether the specific designation at issue required 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.26  Justice Brennan, in opening the opinion of the 
Court, declared what was at stake, foreshadowing the Court’s holding: 
Over the past 50 years, all 50 states and over 500 municipalities have enacted 
laws to encourage or require the preservation of buildings and areas with historic 
or aesthetic importance.  These nationwide legislative efforts have been 
precipitated by two concerns.  The first is recognition that, in recent years, large 
numbers of historic structures, landmarks, and areas have been destroyed without 
adequate consideration of either the values represented therein or the possibility 
of preserving the destroyed properties for use in economically productive ways.  
The second is a widely shared belief that structures with special historic, cultural, 
or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all.  Not only do these 
buildings and their workmanship represent the lessons of the past and embody 
precious features of our heritage, they serve as examples of quality for today.27 
 
Ultimately, the Court rejected Penn Central’s argument and held that the City committed 
no unconstitutional taking by the designation.  First, the Court declared the ordinance not invalid 
per se by the fact that it failed to provide compensation to owners prohibited what was allowed 
them under the general zoning code.28  Second, it found that as applied, the ordinance did not 
constitute a taking because it did not deny Penn Central the ability to receive a return on its 
investment.  On this issue, the Court noted that the law did not interfere with the company’s 
present use of the terminal, nor did it preclude the property from being used as it had for the prior 
sixty-five years.29  In the course of the opinion, Justice Brennan, responding to plaintiffs 
argument that it was entirely burdened without any corresponding benefit, explained that to hold 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 See id. at 122.  The other issue presented was whether the transferable development rights afforded under 
the ordinance constituted just compensation to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.  Because the Court determined no 
taking had occurred, it never reached this second issue.  See id. 
26 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129. 
27 Id. at 107. 
28 See id. at 135-36. 
29 See id. at 136.  In finding such, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the air rights above the 
terminal had been entirely taken.  First, the Court explained that the Commission had not prohibited any 
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for the plaintiff the Court would have to reject the notion that historic preservation benefits all 
citizens both economically and by improving the quality of life in the city.30  This, Brennan 
stated, the Court would not do.31 
Although Penn Central is most noted for its contribution to takings jurisprudence,32 the 
Court’s pronouncement regarding the economic and social value of preservation profoundly 
effected the future of the historic preservation movement. 
C.  The Impact of Penn Central on the Preservation Movement 
The National Trust for Historic Preservation explains that the significance of Penn 
Central for preservationists is its role as a “movement validator.”33  In 1978, when the Court 
heard the case, roughly five-hundred preservation ordinances had been enacted nationwide.  
Today, over two-thousand ordinances are in effect around the country, a number that continues 
to grow.34 
Penn Central not only provided validation and encouragement for local governments to 
enact preservation ordinances, but it has also profoundly affected the courts.  Although the Penn 
Central Court validated the ordinance in the face of an as applied challenge, subsequent courts 
have approached similar cases as though Penn Central established a per se rule.  A well-known 
preservation case from Pennsylvania is illustrative of the point. 
In United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,35 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court addressed a takings challenge brought by the owner of a theater deemed a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
construction above the terminal.  Second, it noted the ordinance’s saving provision allowing for TDRs that could 
have been transferred to other nearby properties.  See id. at 136-37. 
30 See id. at 134-35. 
31 See id. 
32 See infra Section III.A. for further discussion and explanation. 
33 Paul W. Edmondson, National Trust for Historic Preservation, “An Introduction to the Takings Issue in 
the Historic Preservation Context,” SE31 ALI-ABA 285, 290 (Oct. 18, 1999). 
34 See id. 
35 635 A.2d 612 (Penn. 1993). 
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landmark under the local preservation ordinance.  Although it noted that the issues in dispute 
were strikingly similar to Penn Central, the United Artists’ court distinguished the case by the 
fact that it was to determine whether a taking had occurred under the state’s constitution.36  
Although it recognized that an analysis under Pennsylvania law could produce a different 
outcome from Penn Central, the United Artists’ court largely relied on decisions from other 
states.  Explaining that “[t]he fact that no other state has broken with the Penn Central decision 
is not dispositive of the matter,” the court explained “it is persuasive”37 and held that no taking 
had occurred.38 
The United Artists’ decision is representative of post-Penn Central legal challenges to 
preservation ordinances which have consistently failed.39  In light of Penn Central, it appears as 
though, for better or worse, greater deference is given to governmental defendants in 
preservation-related takings cases.40  Certainly United Artists’ demonstrates the influence of 
Penn Central over the nation’s courts: 
[S]ince Penn Central, no other state has rejected the notion that no taking occurs 
when a state designates a building as historic.  The decade and a half in which the 
Penn Central decision has enjoyed widespread acceptance weighs against our 
rejecting the Penn Central analysis.41 
 
As with Penn Central, subsequent cases consistently reiterate that preservation zoning is 
grounded on a valid public purpose outweighing the burdens placed on an individual landowner.  
According to Penn Central, this purpose is founded on two presumptions: first, that a large 
                                                          
36 See United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 614-15 (Penn 1993). 
37 United Artists’, 635 A.2d at 619. 
38 See id. at 620. 
39 See Edmondson, supra note 33. 
40 See Daniel T. Caravello, Comment, From Penn Central to United Artists I & II: The Rise to Immunity of 
Historic Preservation Designation From Successful Takings Challenges, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 593, 616-17 
(1995) ("The decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in United Artists' I and United Artists' II demonstrate the 
proposition that since the Penn Central decision, historic preservation designations have become immune from 
successful constitutional takings challenges."). 
41 See United Artists’, 635 A.2d at 619.  
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number of historic buildings are destroyed before their economic value is recognized; and 
second, that the preservation of historic structures enhances the quality of life for all.  The 
question that must be asked nearly twenty-five years after Justice Brennan made this 
pronouncement is whether these two presumptions are still valid.  The remainder of the paper 
considers the legitimacy of these presumptions in light of two issues: the condition known as 
urban sprawl; and the unfettered legal success of preservation zoning and corresponding 
proliferation of historic designations. 
II.  SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS/ POTENTIAL COSTS 
A.  The Matter of Urban Sprawl. 
Over the past decade, urban sprawl has gained national attention and importance.  
Although the topic is frequently addressed by the media, and most people have a vague 
understanding of what sprawl is, there is no consensus as to its qualities and effects.  While it is 
not the purpose of this paper to detail the problem of sprawl, the term requires at least a base-
level definition.  In a 1998 speech, then Vice-President Al Gore identified the causes and effects 
of urban sprawl: 
In the last fifty years, we’ve built flat, not tall: because land is cheaper the further 
out it lies, new office buildings, roads, and malls go up farther and farther out, 
lengthening commutes and adding to pollution. . . .  
 
Drive times and congestion increase; Americans waste about half a billion 
hours a year stuck in traffic congestion.  An hour and a half commute each day is 
ten full workdays a year spent just stuck in traffic. . . .  
 
So the exhausted commuter seeks affordable housing further out—and 
can’t help pushing local farmers out of business, since family farms can’t pay the 
raising property taxes.  Orchards and dairy farms go under; the commute gets 
even longer; and nobody wins . . . .42 
 
                                                          
42 Peter N. Herman, “Smart Growth: Consensus Forming to Put the Brakes on Suburban Sprawl,” NEW 
YORK LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 10, 1999, at 5 (quoting Gore speech). 
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The picture painted here is a bleak one, but it is occurring across the nation.  Gore’s observation 
that the nation is building flat and not tall suggests the fundamental question: why?  Although the 
answer to this question is much larger than the scope of this paper, the remainder considers 
whether historic preservation zoning might have a part to play in this phenomenon. 
By way of example, in the Woody Allen neighborhood dispute described in the 
introduction, the Landmarks Preservation Commission ultimately restricted the proposed 
building to almost half its allowable height after concluding it was too tall for its surroundings.  
Furthermore, in Penn Central, the Commission similarly deemed a fifty-five story skyscraper 
inappropriate for its location.  In these examples, two Manhattan building lots were made 
“flatter” than allowed by zoning because of historic preservation concerns.  Multiple decisions 
like these, in the aggregate, could very well contribute to sprawl. 
 Preservationists have properly noted that urban sprawl presents the same threats to their 
cause today as urban renewal presented to the movement in the 1960s.43  Furthermore, 
preservation advocates view their cause as presenting an alternative, some say even an antidote, 
to sprawl.44  They reason that when downtowns are revitalized, neighborhoods restored, and 
urban buildings rehabilitated, there is less pressure to destroy the greenspace at the fringes of 
cities.45  This, they explain, is because traditional downtowns and neighborhoods are walkable, 
thus providing an alternative to driving.46  Therefore, they proclaim, preservation is “a big part of 
the solution to the problem of sprawl.”47 
                                                          
43 See National Trust for Historic Preservation, CHALLENGING SPRAWL: ORGANIZAITONAL RESPONSES TO A 
NATIONAL PROBLEM, 13 (1999). 
44 See National Trust, supra note 44, at 12; see also Rachel L. Schowalter, Reuse, Restore, Recycle: 
Historic Preservation as an Alternative to Sprawl, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10418 (1999). 
45 See National Trust, supra note 44, at 12. 
46 See id. 
47 Id. 
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 The aforementioned benefits of preservation notwithstanding, preservationists may be a 
bit too quick to proclaim they have a solution for sprawl.48  While preservation may have a 
number of virtues, it is not entirely free from negative effects.  Although preservationists are 
often lauded as urban champions, they might also be viewed as sharing traits with those 
commonly known as NIMBYs.  Although NIMBYs are typically associated with opposing those 
obviously negative facilities and programs that diminish local quality of life, preservationists 
typically oppose new construction for the very reason that it will reduce the quality of life in 
their neighborhoods or cities.49  Several scholars have observed that most Americans are 
unaware of their role in causing growth-related problems.50  In this regard, preservationists may 
be no different.  And according to sprawl opponents, NIMBYism contributes to sprawl: 
Although sometimes well-intentioned, NIMBYism has inadvertently contributed 
to sprawl by pushing new developments farther and farther away from the city 
center.  The reason for this is relatively simple: because developers often want to 
avoid conflicts with citizen groups—conflicts that increase project time and 
reduce profits—they choose to build where there is little opposition to the 
proposed developments.  In many instances, these new locations are cornfields or 
cow pastures (after all, corn and cows are not invited to public hearings) on the 
suburban fringe—locations removed from other developments and where land is 
relatively inexpensive.51 
 
Sprawl opponents explain that the way to fight sprawl is by channeling new growth to be 
contiguous and more dense.52  Although preservationists claim their cause is consistent with the 
goal of open space preservation, the site-specific focus of preservation zoning and the NIMBY 
                                                          
48 It can be argued that preservationists arguments for preserving the cities are the same as those of New 
Urbanists and their espousal of traditional walking neighborhoods and cities, and a mix of urban uses.  Taking this 
approach, one could argue whether the actual physical historic structures are necessary, or if they simply serve as 
examples of the kind of urban form New Urbanists have already re-discovered.  
49 E.g. Woody Allen and his Upper East Side neighbors. 
50 See NRDC, ONCE THERE WERE GREENFIELDS: HOW URBAN SPRAWL IS UNDERMINING AMERICA’S 
ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY, AND SOCIAL FABRIC, 11 (1999). 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
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nature of its proponents may prove otherwise.  An examination of preservation in New York City 
since Penn Central provides an example. 
B.  The Problem of Sprawl and Office Space in New York 
Sprawl is typically thought of as most seriously affecting automobile-oriented sunbelt 
cities.  However, this is simply not the case.  In a recent study on urban growth patterns, the 
Brookings Institution challenged the conventional wisdom that sprawl is most problematic in the 
south and west.53  The study defines sprawl as taking place in cities where land is consumed at a 
rate faster than population growth, arriving at a figure that measures the entire loss of density in 
cities, not focusing solely on residential, commercial, or open space trends.54  The study found 
that nationwide, between 1982 and 1997, urbanized land in the U.S. increased by 47%, while 
population grew by just 17%.55  Furthermore, because the “rust belt” areas of the Northeast and 
Midwest are eating up raw land with very little gain in population, the report identifies these 
areas as representing the nation’s biggest sprawl problems.56  New York City is no exception. 
In a case-study component of its report, the Brookings Institution compared New York 
City and Los Angeles, the two most populous cities in the country.  Viewed traditionally as 
dense and sprawling respectively, the study demonstrates that at a gross scale, the cities are 
strikingly similar, with New York’s density at 7.99 persons per urbanized acre, and Los Angeles 
at a surprisingly more dense 8.31 persons per acre.57  Equally surprising is the finding that from 
1982-1997 New York urbanized at a rate of 2.37 persons per acre, while Los Angeles urbanized 
                                                          
53 See William Fulton et. al., Who Sprawls Most? How Growth Patterns Differ Across the U.S., Brookings 
Institution (July 2001). 
54 See id. at 1. 
55 See id. at 4.  Urbanized land is defined as any area with a population density over 1,000 persons per 
square mile.  See id. 
56 See id. at 9. 
57 See id. at 14. 
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at 9.12 persons per acre.58  On these facts, the report concludes that “[a]lthough it is still 
extremely dense at the center, New York is sprawling dramatically on the edges.”59 
Compounding New York’s sprawl problem is the fact that the commercial building stock 
in Manhattan is among the oldest in the nation.60  It is a well known fact that in recent decades, 
the trend has been for urban office space to move to the suburbs.  As of 1999, less than half of 
the nation’s offices are located in central cities.61  Although the majority of metropolitan New 
York’s office space remains in Manhattan, the same trend is clearly evident.  In 1980 Manhattan 
held nearly 80% of all office space in the metropolitan area.  However, by 2000, Manhattan’s 
share dropped by over 20%.62  The fact that jobs are generally moving to the suburbs is not 
surprising given the abundance of cheap land and second income sources of labor, but New York 
is additionally plagued by the reality that its core-area buildings are largely outdated.  Nearly 
80% of the building stock in Manhattan is of pre-1979 construction,63 meaning that for 
Manhattan to remain competitive for office space, its present buildings must be amenable to 
replacement or renovation to meet current and future working space and technology needs.64 
Moreover, compounding the problem of outmoded buildings, the City is facing a crisis-
level need for more office space.  So much so that New York Senator Charles Schumer formed a 
think-tank type committee (“task force”) to address the situation.  In its report issued in June 
2001, the task force on New York City commercial space sounded an alarm, explaining that 
                                                          
58 See id. 
59 See Fulton, supra note 54, at 14. 
60 See Robert E. Lang, Office Sprawl: The Evolving Geography of Business, The Brookings Institution 
Survey Series (Oct. 2000). 
61 See id. at 4. 
62 See id. at Appendix Table 13.  The table shows the pre-1979 total as 78.8% Manhattan and 17.0% 
suburban, and the 2000 total as 56.7% Manhattan and 34.5% suburban. 
63 Using figures from Table 13.  299.2 million square feet of space pre 1979 and 390.1 million square feet 
after.   
64 High-tech firms and FIRE (financial, insurance, real estate) sector business are particularly likely to 
move to new suburban offices due to fiber-optic infrastructure and advanced telecommunications equipment which 
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“[t]he city’s main economic concern is not that new employment growth might wane in the short 
term—it is that there is not enough new office space to support future employment growth.”65   
According to the task force report, New York must add sixty million square feet of new 
office space before 2020 in order to capitalize on the projected 300,000 office jobs available for 
capture.66  The present space shortage results from a glut in office space caused by the 1980’s 
building boom that resulted in little being built during the 1990s.67  However, as the 1990s came 
to a close, the market absorbed some thirty-seven million square feet due to increasing demand.68  
Presently, with little new space to meet the growing demand, Manhattan rents have reached all-
time highs, with vacancy rates dropping to their lowest levels in twenty years.69  As a result, the 
task force explains, the city is at a crisis point where the lack of space is causing expanding 
companies to relocate.70  This all without the impact of the September 11 terrorist attack, which 
has exacerbated the City’s predicament.71 
According to the task force, two of the most significant obstacles to constructing new 
office space are inadequate zoning and barriers to assembling sufficient parcel space to build 
economically feasible high-rises.72  According to the report, much of the land that can support 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
allows for easy networking.  See Robert Cervero, AMERICA’S SUBURBAN CENTERS: THE LAND USE-
TRANSPORTATION LINK, 5 (1989).    
65 PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: A COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR NEW YORK CITY, Group of 
35 Final Report, at 2 (June 2001). 
66 See id. at 3. 
67 See id. at 15. 
68 See id. at 14. 
69 See id. at 3.  Manhattan vacancy rates dropped from over 16% in 1996 to 3.4% in 2001.  See id. at 18. 
70 See id.  By way of illustration, between 1997 and 2000, eighteen New York City based companies made 
commitments to move into six million square feet of new space in nearby Hudson County New Jersey, costing New 
York some 30,000 jobs.  See id. at 19. 
71 As a result of September 11, it is estimated that the City lost over twenty million square feet of office 
space.  See Charles V. Bagli, “Seeking Safety, Downtown Firms are Scattering,” NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, 
at A1.  The terror attack on the World Trade Center and the related displacement of downtown businesses has 
caused many to consider leaving New York City altogether.  See id.; Charles V. Bagli, “Playing the ‘Jersey Card,’ 
Firms in Manhattan Compare Incentives, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at D1.  
72 See PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 66, at 4. 
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new office development is not zoned to encourage such development.73  In addition, zoning also 
must allow for sufficient density to make a project profitable.74  Furthermore, due to a number of 
factors, the costs associated with assembling an adequately sized parcel make many potential 
projects untenable.75 
The task force report does not mention any connection between these obstacles and 
historic preservation zoning.  But nonetheless, that does not mean the placement and sheer 
volume of designated properties is not at least a contributing factor.  Although there is no hard 
evidence to support such a conclusion, there is evidence to suggest the possibility, especially if 
one considers the sheer volume of activity undertaken by the Landmarks Preservation 
Commission since Penn Central.  
C.  Designation of Historic Buildings: Can There Be too Much? 
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court noted that in the roughly thirteen years since New 
York enacted its preservation ordinance, the city had designated over four-hundred individual 
landmarks and thirty-one historic districts.76  As mentioned above, because the Penn Central 
decision served as a movement validator, the city continues to designate properties at a similar 
rate.  Presently, the city recognizes 1,070 individual properties and seventy-seven districts as 
historic landmarks.  Combined these comprise over 21,000 properties,77 together occupying 2% 
of New York City’s building lots.78 
                                                          
73 See id. at 22. 
74 See id. 
75 See id.  Most new buildings require at a minimum a roughly square-shaped lot of 25,000 or more square 
feet.  See id. and discussion infra Part II.D. 
76 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 111. 
77 See New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission website: www.nyc.gov/html/lpc/html/about  
(visited by author, Oct. 1, 2001). 
78 See id. 
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Two percent of the building lots may not seem all that significant,79 but, it should be 
noted that the number of available building lots remains constant while designation of landmarks 
continues in earnest.80  Although the Commission has designated a vast number of buildings, 
causing one to think most of the truly landmark quality buildings are already protected, the 
designation of landmarks continues without much sign of slowing.  The Commission is currently 
designating properties at a rate of about twenty-five buildings and two districts per year.81  
According to its chairwoman, the Commission is “very, very active” in identifying new 
properties for listing.82  Although it is true that the Commission has already identified most of 
the city’s recognizably grand and beautiful buildings, the recent trend is to designate more 
average buildings that tell the story of the common-person.  And telling such a story typically 
requires more real estate than a single grand building which can stand on its own architectural 
and/or historical merits. 
For example, the Commission recently designated a district to represent a period of New 
York’s business history.83  The Madison Square North Historic District, designated in 2001, 
encompasses ten blocks of Midtown Manhattan, consisting largely of office buildings 
constructed between the 1890s and early 1900s.84  Certainly, this area was selected for the era it 
represents, however, it cannot be overlooked that it takes a ten block chunk of valuable 
Manhattan real estate to serve as that contextual representation.  Furthermore, there is evidence 
this broad contextualism is a growing phenomenon, set to include not just New York’s 
                                                          
79 Particularly to the Landmarks Preservation Commission which explains that it is “only” 2% of the lots 
that are listed.  See id. 
80 Furthermore, 2% of the five boroughs may not be much, but the density of landmarks in Manhattan is 
surely higher. 
81 See Jim O’Grady, “Landmarks for Common Folk,” NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 5, 2000, at 14.1. 
82 See id. 
83 See Andrew Friedman, “Madison Square: 10 Blocks of Commercial Hallmarks Transformed Into 
Lnadmarks,” NEW YORK TIMES, July 1, 2001, at 14.5; “Madison Square North,” Landmarks Commission News, 
Fall/Winter 2001, located at www.nyc.gov/html/lpc/pdfs/highlights/winter01.pdf. 
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commercial history, but its cultural and social history as well.  As a recent New York Times 
article explained: 
[A] growing number of preservationists are trying to expand the definition of 
what qualifies for [landmark] status.  The aim is to move beyond high-style 
architectural structures like Grand Central Terminal or the Chrysler Building to 
ordinary-looking places where important figures other than generals or presidents 
lived, along with places where the common folk worked and played.85 
 
The Commission’s chairwoman notes that few of the city’s current landmarks are recognized for 
purely cultural reasons, amounting to approximately twelve of the over one-thousand individual 
designations.86  However, she notes that cultural sites are “important,” but adds the Commission 
remains preoccupied with its continuing efforts to list more traditionally recognized historic 
buildings and sites.87 
 A recent nationally recognized historic district provides a sign of things to come.  In early 
2001, New York’s Lower East Side was added to the National Register of Historic Places.88  
Although this level of national recognition does not restrict what owners can do to their 
properties as the New York City ordinance,89 it further illustrates the growing trend to expand 
preservation to include the recognition of ordinary lives.  In this case, the area deemed to have 
historic significance consists of over five-hundred buildings, primarily tenements and street-level 
shops.90 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
84 See Friedman supra note 82. 
85 See O’Grady, supra note 81.  The author notes that “cultural landmarking” emerged primarily in New 
York in the early 1990s. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. 
88 See Shaila K. Dewan, “Lower East Side is Added to U.S. Register of Historic Places,” NEW YORK 
TIMES, April 10, 2001, at B3. 
89 Listing on the National Register of Historic Places is more of a carrot than a stick.  It provides a federal 
tax benefit to those owners who take steps to rehabilitate their properties.   See id. 
90 See id.  According to the vice president of the Lower East Side Tenement Museum, the area “[is] 
designated for real cultural reasons.  These drab little tenements, which many New Yorkers still live in, have shaped 
our lives.”  Id.  Andrew Dolkart, author of THE GUIDE TO NEW YORK CITY LANDMARKS and the preparer of the 
National Register nomination admits that “[a]rchitecture is not insignificant here, but it’s not architecture for the 
aesthetics.”  Id. 
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 It is uncertain what impact this trend will have on the future of the city.  But it would 
appear that there are significant issues the city will need to resolve in the not too distant future.  
The next section considers some of the real problems that can result from the proliferation of 
landmark designations. 
D. Connecting the Problem of Accumulation to the Loss of Open Space 
There are at least two significant consequences that can result from a program of 
continuing designation of historic buildings in a city like New York.91  The first relates to the 
fact that buildings have a limited useful life-cycle.  While a building may stand for a great 
number of years, the purpose for which it is constructed is typically of a shorter duration.  
Buildings often become obsolete or unsuited to their surroundings due to changes in technology 
and the marketplace.  Therefore, because the land upon which they sit is a finite resource, 
buildings must be made to adapt to changing economic and social conditions--they must 
periodically be either torn down, or where feasible, put to rehabilitation.92 
The problem of limited useful life is compounded by the accumulation that occurs as 
buildings are continually set aside for preservation under an ordinance.  As explained above, the 
ongoing designation tends to make more sites unavailable for redevelopment either because the 
application of the ordinance makes projects economically unfeasible or developers simply find it 
too risky to test the uncertain approval process.  One scholar has explained the problem of 
landmark accumulation and its negative affects: 
[T]here is gradual accumulation of cultural buildings as each generation 
contributes its own choices to the pool.  Honoring all past conservation decisions 
would result in continuing increases in the number of cultural buildings at the 
                                                          
91 There are more consequences than just the two discussed here.  The major one being the displacement of 
the underclass through gentrification.  While this is not a subject of this paper, surely the analysis herein could be 
applied to the housing context. 
92 For a brief discussion these concepts, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The “Conservation Game:” The 
Possibility of Voluntary Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural Importance, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
733, 737-38 (1997). 
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expense of the community’s other needs.  Because land suitable for development 
is limited, the cumulative growth of preserved buildings may restrict and even 
prevent additional or more intensive development of new housing, roads, schools, 
and so on.93 
 
One might add to this observation, that the development of new office space may also be 
prevented or restricted.  These effects of accumulation are precisely what threatens New York as 
the Landmarks Preservation Commission continues its regular program of designating landmark 
properties.  Not only does the city have to deal with its building stock becoming less utilitarian 
due to aging, but also that the raw number of buildings and sites available for revamped office 
space effectively decreases with each new landmark designation.  This combination of age and 
accumulation contributes to the existing market forces that lead to sprawl and the loss of open 
space on the city’s edges. 
There is no better place to begin an analysis of the potential correlation between historic 
preservation and sprawl than the case of Penn Central.  As explained above, in that situation the 
Commission rejected the company’s plan to construct a tower over its landmarked building—a 
tower that would have attained a height of fifty-five stories.94  The building’s owner certainly 
recognized a demand for office space in the area because it had entered into a long-term lease for 
the proposed skyscraper.  Once the Commission rejected the proposal the demand simply did not 
go away.  By all indications, market forces likely drew the demand out to the suburbs. 
Another important New York preservation case involved a midtown Manhattan church, 
St. Bartholemew’s, and an adjacent commons building located just a few blocks from Grand 
Central.95  The city designated the church and commons building as landmarks in 1967.96  In 
December 1983, seeking to capitalize on rising real estate demand, the Episcopal Church sought 
                                                          
93 Id. at 739-40.  
94 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116, and supra section I.B. 
95 See St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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Commission approval to replace the seven-story commons building with a fifty-nine story office 
tower.97  When the Commission denied successive applications for a “certificate of 
appropriateness”98 under the preservation ordinance, the church filed suit.  The added 
Constitutional twist distinguishing the case from Penn Central was the matter of religious 
freedom.  Ultimately, U.S. Court of Appeals rejected the church’s free exercise claim, finding 
the preservation ordinance to be a valid neutral regulation.99  As to the takings claim, the St. 
Bartholomew’s court followed Penn Central, holding that no taking had occurred because the 
property could be used as it always had.100 
Penn Central and St. Bartholomew’s represent two occurrences where, despite a demand 
for new office space, skyscrapers were never built.  Furthermore, they arguably represent 
situations where two building sites were effectively removed from the real estate market by their 
landmark status.  Although it is possible that the demand to be satisfied by these towers relocated 
to other buildings in the vicinity, it is also possible that the projected occupants of these proposed 
buildings moved to the suburbs. 
The reason why an office would move from the city to the suburbs has been explained 
over and again as part of the sprawl debate.  To summarize, the suburbs offer a number of 
advantages, including lower land and construction costs, liberal zoning ordinances, and ample 
room for parking and open space.101  However, it has also been well documented that the move 
to the suburbs has its consequences—sprawl.  The principal problem resulting from the 
migration of high-rise offices to the suburbs is that suburban office buildings are almost 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
96 See St. Bartholomew’s, 914 F. 2d at 351. 
97 See id. 
98 The Commission must approve this certificate as a preliminary step in the construction permitting 
process. 
99 See id. at 355-56. 
100 See id. at 357. 
101 See Urban Land Institute, OFFICE DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, 13 (2d ed. 1998). 
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universally configured on a lateral rather than vertical plane.  These “horizontal skyscrapers” 
form the archetypal centerpiece to the modern office park.102  Suburban business parks are 
designed to provide a premium, rural-like environment for their workers, offering groomed 
landscapes, airy office space, and plentiful parking.103  In addition to the fact that the location of 
these office parks significantly contributes to traffic congestion,104 their principal nuisance is the 
amount of land they consume. 
The measure of the efficiency of the use of land by a building is called floor-to-area ratio 
(“FAR”).105  FAR is a measurement of density, determined by dividing the building’s gross size 
(in square feet) by the size of the building site (in square feet).106  High-rise office buildings, as 
can be imagined, have much greater FARs than suburban office parks.  Because skyscrapers 
typically, and especially in midtown Manhattan, cover almost the entirety of their lots, their 
FARs are generally twenty and higher.107  By way of example, a one-story building that entirely 
covers its building site has a FAR of 1—an equal amount of building and site area.  A twenty-
story building that entirely covers its site has a FAR of 20.  Similarly, a forty-story building 
covering half of its building site has the same FAR—20. 
Suburban office buildings, conversely, have low FARs.  Most new suburban workplaces 
are built at FARs of .20 to .30.108   By way of example, a one-story office building (or more 
likely collection of buildings) occupying one-quarter of its site has a FAR of .25.  Similarly, a 
                                                          
102 See Robert Cervero, AMERICA’S SUBURBAN CENTERS: THE LAND USE TRANSPORTATION LINK, 36 
(1989). 
103 See id. at 6. 
104 Cervero notes that suburban offices are built at densities considerably below that of inner cities, making 
mass-transit impracticable.  Furthermore, due to the spread-out nature of the buildings themselves, the possibility of 
walking, cycling, and most forms of group travel are less convenient than the automobile, thus adding to street 
congestion.  See Cervero, supra note 102, at 1-2. 
105 See OFFICE DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 101, at 128. 
106 See id.  FAR is typically shown as a decimal, but sometimes may be expressed as a percentage.  See id. 
107 See id. at 128. 
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four-story building taking up one-sixteenth of the lot area has the same FAR—.25.  In addition to 
the space consumed by vast atriums and wide-open lawns, a major reason for the lack of density 
in suburban office complexes is parking.  With a typical suburban office, 1,300 square feet of 
land is paved as parking for every 1,000 square feet of building area.109   
Returning to the issue of where the proposed office space in Penn Central and St. 
Bartholomew’s may have gone, one can see the effect of historic preservation on the loss of 
greenspace by quantifying and comparing the amount of land required to support the same 
amount of office workers in the city and suburbs.  Without having actual figures on the proposed 
floor size of the buildings rejected in the two cases, an estimate is in order.  The floorplate of a 
typical office building (the size of a single floor) averages between 18,000 and 30,000 square 
feet.110  Of course, this is an average, and large skyscrapers have more sizeable floorplates.  The 
Empire State Building, for example, sits on a lot of some 85,000 square feet.111  While that 
building may not entirely occupy its site, a typical large Manhattan skyscraper has a floorplate of 
roughly half of that or just over 40,000 square feet.112 
The building proposed in Penn Central stood at fifty-five stories, while the building 
proposed in St. Bartholomew’s totaled fifty-nine.  Together they amount to one-hundred fourteen 
floors, and at an estimated 40,000 square feet per floor, total 4.56 million square feet of space.  If 
that amount of Manhattan office space moves to suburban New York due to market and 
ordinance-related reasons discussed above, the amount of greenspace consumed is alarming.  At 
the typical suburban office FAR of .25, 19.4 million square feet of suburban land is required to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
108 See NRCD, ONCE THERE WERE GREENFIELDS, supra note 50, at 38.  The Urban Land Institute, 
however, states that the typical suburban office development has a FAR of .25 to .50.  See OFFICE DEVELOPMENT 
HANDBOOK, supra note 101, at 128. 
109 See Cervero, supra note 102, at 33. 
110 See OFFICE DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 101, at 8. 
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house the same number of workers as 4.56 million square feet of building space in the city.  To 
put it in a more understandable figure, the 40,000 square foot lots in Manhattan are roughly one 
acre each, and the equivalent open space lost in the suburbs totals more than 445 acres.113  
Therefore, in the cases of Penn Central and St. Bartholomew’s, the inability to develop two acres 
in the city could have amounted to a loss of almost 450 acres of greenspace in the suburbs.  
Furthermore, this 450 acre figure does not account for additional space lost to corresponding 
roads and strip-type developments that would be constructed to serve the suburban workers.  
This associated loss of land is not a factor in Manhattan where the infrastructure already exists. 
Certainly, this analysis is easily debatable.  There are so many economic, social, and 
zoning-related matters to account for that a truly scientific study of this subject would consume 
volumes.  Therefore, it must be clearly stated that the point to be made here is illustrative, not 
empirical.  And the point is this: negative externalities accompany every public choice.  Or, as 
applied to historic preservation zoning: with every landmark that is designated in the name of 
preserving a reminder of the city’s past, there may be resulting land use impacts on that city’s 
present and future.   
Hopefully the point has been illustrated using the subject of New York City and its two 
most famous historic preservation lawsuits.  Although one might want to disregard this analysis 
as unscientific or overly ambitious, the documented trend of accumulation and the need for 
office space in the city might conversely cause one to consider whether the process of 
landmarking should be more scrutinized.  To date, the City of New York has designated 2% of 
its buildable lots as landmarks.  In raw numbers, this is more than 22,000 lots, a number that 
continues to grow.  The Preservation Commission’s actions in Penn Central and St. 
Bartholemew’s potentially caused a loss of suburban greenspace in the hundreds of acres. 
                                                          
113 One acre equals 43,560 square feet. 
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Surely, there are numerous similar actions of the Commission that have gone 
unchallenged.  The cumulative effect of the Commission’s decisions in overseeing 22,000 
properties could be significant.  By way of example, if the Commission’s actions caused a mere 
1% of the 22,000 landmark owners not to build ten floors, the corresponding loss of land in the 
suburbs under the above analysis is more than three square miles of open space.114  This is the 
equivalent of two-and-one-half Central Parks.115 
To summarize, the practice of historic preservation zoning, since Penn Central, has gone 
virtually unchallenged.  In New York City, sprawl is occurring and there will be a desperate need 
for commercial office space in the coming decades.  Without new or rehabilitated space, jobs 
will be lost to other areas, and the sprawl problem will be magnified.  At the same time 2% of the 
city’s building lots fall under the city’s preservation ordinance, and the great number of 
commercial buildings so designated are thereby made more difficult to upgrade to modern uses.  
As a result, central city office space is getting more obsolete and made less available to 
redevelopment as more areas are designated landmarks.  Therefore, landmark designation may 
be an obstacle to feasible urban redevelopment, contributing to the office space shortage and 
urban sprawl without preservationists even being aware of it.  As the city makes more properties 
subject to the ordinance, and the negative external effects of historic designation become more 
evident, there is a greater likelihood that new legal challenges will arise.  The next section 
examines the likelihood of success of future takings challenges, and how preservation advocates 
might change the function of the ordinance to avoid losing these challenges. 
 
                                                          
114 Based on the following calculation: 1% of 22,000 equals 220 potential sites affected.  220 multiplied by 
ten floors at 40,000 square feet per floor equals eighty-eight million square feet of space.  Eighty-eight million 
square feet equals 2,020 acres which at 640 acres per square mile is 3.16 square miles.  Furthermore, as discussed 
before, this area does not include the loss of open space to infrastructure and supporting businesses. 
115 Central Park is 843 acres in size.  See www.centralpark.org. 
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III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
A.  Takings Jurisprudence Since Penn Central 
As discussed above, the Penn Central decision laid down the principal that landmark 
designation of a property does not amount to a regulatory taking under the Constitution.  Penn 
Central establishes the takings test for all regulatory situations—a three-part inquiry balancing 
the government interest, the owner’s investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action.116  Although the Penn Central takings analysis has been criticized as too 
deferential to government actors,117 several Supreme Court decisions since Penn Central 
demonstrate the Court’s willingness to more closely scrutinize governmental actions in the 
takings context. 
Since Penn Central, two cases in particular illustrate the Court’s scrutiny of government 
actions in determining whether the action advances a stated purpose.  In Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission,118 the Court considered whether a requirement that beachfront property 
owners grant a permanent easement in exchange for a building permit amounted to an 
unconstitutional taking.  Recognizing that a legitimate governmental interest was involved, 
Justice Scalia, for the majority, found there was an insufficient connection between the interest to 
be furthered and the burden of the easement requirement.119  Because there was not an “essential 
                                                          
116 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.  For a general overview of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence, 
see David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights Have 
Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 
523 (1999). 
117 For an analysis of just how deferential the Penn Central balancing test can be, see Basil H. Mattingly, 
Forum Over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 36 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 695 (2000).  Mattingly, through an empirical analysis of over ninety reported regulatory takings cases, argues 
the Penn Central test is “nothing more than a strong presumption in favor of no compensation, regardless of the 
impact of the regulation.”  Id. at 699. 
118 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
119  See Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 838-39 (1987). 
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nexus” between the two, the Nollan Court found that the government’s condition resulted in an 
unconstitutional taking of property.120 
The Court further expanded on this “rational nexus” analysis between government 
purpose and government action in Dolan v. City of Tigard.121  There, the city required the 
property owner, in order to receive a building permit, to grant an easement for a public bike path 
and drainage.122  The Court, as it had in Nollan, examined the nexus between the purpose and 
requirement and found the appropriate degree of connection to be lacking.  Examining the facts, 
the Court further expanded on the essential nexus concept, holding that there must in addition be 
a “rough proportionality” between the burden of the regulation and the stated government 
goal.123  Here, the government had imposed more than required to meet the goal, and the 
requirement was struck down. 
Although these two cases concerned more specifically government exactions, and not 
direct regulation as in the historic preservation context, the message sent by the Court is clear—
government actions are more likely to be takings where they do not sufficiently advance the 
proposed goal.  Applying this theme to future regulatory cases, the Court is more likely to 
consider and question the effects of a regulation, rather than simply defer to the stated 
government purpose under a balancing test. 
Specifically in the historic preservation context, the Court’s inquiry under Penn Central 
is made on a case-by-case basis.  One of the three-part factors is the government interest and 
justification for it, and the Court has made clear the relative importance of this factor to the 
                                                          
120 See Nollan, 438 U.S. at 837, 841-42. 
121 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
122 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 380 (1994). 
123 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
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analysis in subsequent cases.124  So, although in future cases the Court may not be so apt to 
question whether a legislative body has made a rational choice regarding what is in the public 
interest, it may be more willing to examine how the furtherance of that interest is realized 
through the regulation. 
B. Preservation as a Taking Under the New Standard? 
Under this new era of heightened scrutiny, historic preservation might not fare as well as 
it has to date.  Under a takings analysis, the first question is whether the regulation serves a 
legitimate governmental purpose.  There is little room to argue that historic preservation does not 
rationally serve the public--Penn Central establishes this fact.125  Therefore, preservation related 
regulation almost surely survives a Nollan-type “essential nexus” analysis because the 
government goal is to preserve endangered resources, and the regulation does this directly.  
Therefore, the question becomes one of whether the relationship between the goal and the burden 
on the owner is roughly proportional under Dolan. 
The potential for failing the Dolan test is made clear by considering the increasing 
numbers of buildings designated as landmarks.  The underlying issue it raises is whether a 
qualitative difference exists between the tenth landmark building designated (e.g. the Empire 
State Building), and the 1,110th building designated (e.g. a Lower East Side Tenement).  Or to 
put it more succinctly, if the goal is to preserve buildings to enhance the quality of public life—
how many buildings are necessary to further this goal?  Arguably, at some point, there will be 
more buildings designated landmarks than are necessary to achieve the goal.  This is particularly 
relevant under the justifications traditionally given for preservation—economics, tourism, sense 
                                                          
124 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning law to 
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests [citation 
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125 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134. 
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of place, etc.  Even assuming these goals are not achieved by the time the 1,100th or 21,000th 
building is landmarked, there must be a point somewhere where the benefit is so small in light of 
all the prior designations, that the burden on the property owner outweighs the meager benefit.  
In other words, a point will be reached at which the burden placed on a landmark owner is not 
“roughly proportional” to the benefit given the public, because that public benefit already has 
been largely achieved. 
C. Avoiding Future Takings Challenges 
As explained above, the ongoing process of landmark designation leads to an 
accumulation of protected resources, which over time leads to negative impacts on other 
government land-use interests.  Penn Central validated historic preservation as a legitimate 
governmental interest,126 whereas in a later case, Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court found open 
space preservation to be a valid basis for regulation.127  A problem arises when these interests 
become exclusive of each other.  With regard to accumulation of historic properties under zoning 
laws, preservationists need to take steps to ensure such regulation continues to serve public 
interests, thereby avoiding takings challenges that may arise in the future. 
One reason the Penn Central Court held preservation a valid government interest was its 
determination that New York’s program was a component of a larger plan.128  However, while 
this planning connection appears real according to the program’s enumerated purpose, the 
connection does not exist so much in the practical sense.  Under the New York City 
Administrative Code, the Landmarks Preservation Commission has the power to designate a 
property as a landmark.129  Upon close inspection of the designation procedures, it appears far 
                                                          
126 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-35. 
127 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 261 (1980). 
128 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132. 
129 See NYC Administrative Code § 25-303(a) (2001). 
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from conclusive that the Commission’s activities are truly integrated into the city’s planning 
processes. 
Such an examination begins by looking at the composition of the Commission itself.  It is 
an eleven member body designated by mayoral appointment.130  Under the city code, the 
Commission is to consist of the following: three architects; one historian; one realtor; five 
citizens, one each representing the five boroughs; and one city planner or landscape architect.131   
The composition of the Commission hardly establishes a solid connection to the city’s planning 
department. 
Although its membership could cause the Commission to be overly parochial in its 
viewpoint, its actions are not entirely lacking review.  Once the Commission makes a 
determination, that action is of full force and effect,132 but each action is forwarded to the city 
Planning Commission for review.133  While this review seems to provide a degree of 
connectivity to citywide planning, the Planning Commission’s role is limited in two significant 
ways.  First, the Planning Commission has no direct ability to overturn a Preservation 
Commission decision--it can only make a recommendation to the City Council whether or not to 
affirm.134  More importantly, however, the scope of Planning Commission review is limited to 
the impact of the designation on the “area involved.”135  Therefore, the Planning Commission 
does not take into account the effect of a designation on anything greater than the property’s 
immediate vicinity.  Finally, once the Planning commission has made its report, the City Council 
                                                          
130 See New York City Charter § 3020(2)(a). 
131 See Charter § 3020(1)(2001). 
132 See Charter § 3020(8). 
133 See id. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. § 3020(8)(a) (The Planning Commission shall submit a report to the council “with respect to the 
relation of any such designation, whether of a historic district or a landmark, to the zoning resolution, projected 
public, improvements, and any plans for the development, growth, improvement or renewal of the area involved.”). 
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has 120 days to modify or disapprove of the designation on a majority vote.  There is no code 
requirement for substantive review of a Preservation Commission designation.136 
If New York’s landmark designation process is to be truly considered a component of 
city planning, the entire program should be evaluated at a citywide level—and planners are the 
ones to do it.  The Planning Commission must have an opportunity to review each designation 
and its larger impact, including whether the designation is a step toward achieving the overall 
purpose of the preservation program.  In its review, the Planning Commission should balance all 
the needs of the community.  Because every public program has negative incidental costs, to the 
extent possible, such costs should be quantified and weighed with regard to each designation.  
The Planning Commission, not the Preservation Commission, is the body to do this. 
Despite the almost unchecked deference given by courts to preservation ordinances since 
Penn Central,137 there is some precedent for historic preservation ordinances being subrogated to 
other public purposes.  New York’s highest court recently decided one such case.  In Trustees of 
Union College v. Schenectady City Council,138 the city designated a nine-block area as a 
residential historic district limiting property use exclusively to single-family residences.139  
Union College, sitting adjacent to the historic district and seeking to develop property it owned 
within the district, challenged the city’s authority to exclude under the preservation ordinance.  
At issue, essentially, was resolving the clash between two important government interests—
public education and historic preservation. 
The Union College court held that as a matter of law preservation does not override 
competing educational interests.  Furthermore, it explained that to resolve the matter, the 
                                                          
136 See id. § 3020(9). 
137 See supra Part I.C. 
138 690 N.E.2d 862 (1997). 
139 See Trustees of Union College v. Schenectady City Council, 690 N.E.2d 862, 864 (1997). 
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educational uses must be weighed against the interests in historic preservation to determine how 
the public welfare would be best served.140  Rejecting the city’s argument that the ordinance 
already constituted such a balancing of interests, the court found that “the ordinance merely 
reflects the City’s sweeping policy decision that historical preservation interests will, in all cases, 
outweigh educational interests.”141  This method of determination by the city, the court found, 
was not valid.142 
In Union College, the case involved education, an interest generally given special 
treatment by the courts.143  But another recent case from Washington D.C. involved a challenge 
to historic preservation in light of other public interests.  Kalorama Heights Limited Partnership 
v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs involved the proposed 
demolition of a historic house in the District that was to be replaced by multi-unit 
condominiums.144  Under the zoning ordinance, the Mayor’s Agent could approve demolition of 
historic properties only if the demolition was necessary in the public interest.145  To meet the 
qualification, a construction project had to be of “special merit.”146 Although the demolition at 
issue involved an important structure within a designated historic district, the plaintiff argued 
that his project qualified for the special merit exception thus allowing for the demolition to 
proceed.  Special merit under the ordinance included a number of factors, but the one argued by 
                                                          
140 See Union College, 690 N.E.2d at 865. 
141 See id. 
142 Ultimately, the ordinance was struck down for lack of a saving provision of allowing for special uses in 
the historic district.  The court explained that because the ordinance failed to provide a means by which the city’s 
interest in preservation might be balanced against its educational interests, the ordinance was not substantially 
related to the promotion of health, safety, or welfare, and was thus unconstitutional.  See id. at 866. 
143 As noted by the court in that case.  See id. at 865. 
144 See Kalorama Heights Ltd. P’ship. v. Dist. of Columbia Dept. of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 655 
A.2d 865, 867 (1995).  The house was located in an historic district, however it was not just a typical house.  It 
served as the French Consulate and Embassy from the 1940s until 1984.  By the time of the dispute, however, it had 
been vacant and deteriorating for a number of years.  See id. at 867. 
145 See id. at 869.  The demolition permit could also be approved in the case of economic hardship. 
146 See id. 
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the plaintiff was that the project involved “social and other benefits having a high priority for 
community services.” 147   
The D.C. Court of Appeals found the plaintiff failed to meet his burden.  But it explained 
that this special merit option would not automatically be precluded in cases involving historic 
structures.  In doing so, the court cited a prior case where a shopping center was allowed to be 
built at the expense of all but the facades of two historic buildings and the total destruction of a 
third.148  That court held the special merit requirement was met because the project generated 
two million dollars in tax revenues and provided jobs for 2,000 persons, half of whom were of 
low to moderate incomes.149 
The kind of balancing taken into account in these cases is more of what should be 
undertaken in all landmark related projects.  In effect, all such designations and determinations 
of project appropriateness should be justified in light of the larger public interest.  One way in 
which New York’s Landmarks Preservation Commission can be aided in having its 
determinations take into account broader considerations is to change the criteria for designation.  
Currently, the criteria are very non-specific, with a landmark including any building older than 
thirty years “which has a special character or special historical or aesthetic interest or value as 
part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the city, state or nation.”150  This 
broad definition of landmark should be narrowed, and the Commission should, in concert with 
the Planning Commission, set goals for the city’s preservation program and regularly take stock 
of what new designations are needed to achieve those goals.   
                                                          
147 “Special Merit” was defined under the ordinance as “a plan or building having significant benefits to the 
District of Columbia or the community by virtue of [1] exemplary architecture, [2] specific features of land 
planning, or [3] social or other benefits having a high priority for community services.”  Id. 
148 See id. at 874 (citing Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern, 432 A.2d at 717). 
149 See id. 
150 NYC Admin. Code §25-302(n). 
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Whatever the mechanism, the city needs to evaluate frequently the quality and quantity of 
its historic resources in order to prioritize and justify future designations.  In turn, the 
Preservation Commission must take stock of which representative resources have already been 
designated and which have not, and seek only to recommend for designation properties that work 
to fulfill a commonly recognized government goal.  Before designating a new neighborhood of 
brownstones, for example, the Commission should be made to ask how many have already been 
designated and, according to planning goals, how many more are necessary to represent a 
particular era or type. 
Historic qualities can be found in almost any building over thirty, especially by amateurs 
and locals--particularly under an ordinance that defines what can be considered for designation 
in the vaguest of terms.  To address this program shortfall and avoid future legal challenges, the 
city needs to make the designation and review process less subjective, and more tailored to suit 
larger urban planning goals. 
CONCLUSION 
 As with most government-sponsored programs, historic preservation provides a great 
deal of public benefit.  But with many such programs, it also has negative externalities that 
typically remain untracked.  This study has attempted to illustrate some of the negative effects of 
historic preservation zoning−generally regarding its impact on urban land use, and specifically 
its effect on sprawl.  Although New York City is a distinctly unique subject, the salient points of 
this study have relevance to each of the more the two thousand localities that manage historic 
preservation programs. 
The benefits of preservation have long been heralded, yet since the practice reached its 
maturity with the Penn Central decision, the urban context has changed.  With these changing 
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times, the purposes of municipal preservation programs need reevaluation.  Government-
sponsored preservation was born in an era where the loss of treasured buildings led to a state of 
near-panicked frenzy in our cities.  Now that era has passed.  Nonetheless, under this old 
paradigm, historic preservation commissions continue to designate resources and shape 
redevelopment decisions without much government oversight or external judicial review.  The 
time has come to recognize that these largely unfettered actions can have negative effects on the 
community.  Accordingly, if municipal preservation programs are to continue to provide 
maximum public benefits, they must be remade to address these effects. 
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